Consti prelim - review

1. Yes, the RTC decision should be reversed.

The doctrine of state immunity from suits applies if a case for damages is filed against public officials for actions done in their official capacities. This is because, if the case succeeds, the government would be ultimately liable to appropriate public funds to pay the money judgment. But if public officials are sued for damages in their personal capacity for exceeding their official functions, they will be the only ones ultimately liable; hence, state immunity from suits does not apply.

In this case, AA is suing the DOST officials for damages in their personal capacity. Thus, there is a prima facie showing that state immunity from suits does not apply. It doesn’t matter that the defendants made a counter-allegation that they were just doing their official functions when they rejected AA’s claim. The contradictory allegations all the more require the presentation of evidence in a full blown trial. And yet, the RTC dismissed the case without trial based on the doctrine of non-suability.

Hence, the RTC decision should be reversed.

2. No, EF is not correct.

It is true that in a representative democracy, leaders reign only by obtaining the consent of the electorate during the election. As a rule, after the people have spoken, their vote should be respected. However, these premises work under the assumption that the person elected by the people has all the qualifications for the position and has complied with the requirements and formalities under election law and regulations. In other words, he must be a qualified and bona fide candidate.

Here, EF’s CONA is ostensibly falsified; hence, he cannot be considered a bona fide substitute candidate.

The fact that the electorate chose him over CD is, therefore, inconsequential.

Thus, EF is not correct.

3. Estrada’s submissions are not meritorious.

In case of a vacancy in the office of the President due to the President’s death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation, the Vice-President shall succeed as President. In this scenario, the government of the new President is de jure as it comes into power through the constitutional mechanism of succession.

In the problem, Estrada argued that GMA’s government was de facto, similar to the Japanese-established government during the 2nd World War. He contended, in effect, that the Philippines had two presidents when GMA ascended to the presidency—he as President of the de jure government, and GMA as President of the de facto government. But these submissions are incorrect as Estrada impliedly resigned, thus creating a vacancy in the office of the President. With the vacancy, then Vice President GMA became the new President by virtue of succession. Her government is, thus, not de facto but de jure.

Ergo, Estrada’s submissions are not meritorious.

4. No, the counter-argument is not correct.

Generally, provisions found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing. Thus, they may not be invoked as sources of legally enforceable rights. However, certain provisions under Article II may be deemed self-executing if they are inherently complete in themselves even sans an implementing law from Congress. These include the provisions on the right to life and the right to health.

In the case at bar, the respondents argued that the invocation of the right to life and right to health is inappropriate because provisions under Article II are not self-executing. This is an erroneously sweeping generalization.

Therefore, the counter-argument is not correct.

5. (a) If I were the judge, I will not dismiss the case based on the doctrine of non-suability.

Consent of the state to be sued may be express or implied. Express consent may be in the form of a general or special law. Act No. 3083 is the general law that provides the standing consent of the state to be sued for money claims arising from contracts.

In the case at bar, AZ sued the DA for an unpaid sum of money arising from a contract to deliver farm implements. Though this is a suit against an unincorporated government agency performing a governmental function—and is, in effect, a suit against the state—state immunity has been waived pursuant to Act No. 3083.

So, if I were the judge, I will not dismiss the case based on the doctrine of non-suability.

(b) Yes, AZ may now cause the execution of the judgment in its favor.

Execution of a judgment against the state requires consent distinct from the consent to be sued. But for a money judgment in a case for the recovery of unpaid contractual obligation (where a sum of money had previously been appropriated for the said contract), judgment may be

executed against the said appropriated sum.

In this case, the contract awarded to AZ must have been already covered by an appropriation for that purpose. Once the judgment favorable to AZ is already final and executory, the said appropriated sum may then be targeted for the execution of the money judgment against the DA.

Consequently, AZ may now cause the execution of the judgment in its favor.

6. (a) Yes, the motion should be granted.

A foreign sovereign is immune from suits in the courts of another state. This is a consequence of the doctrine of sovereign equality among states. However, under the restrictive concept of state immunity, a foreign state may be sued for a cause of action arising out of a commercial transaction. This is because a foreign state may be deemed to have descended to the level of an individual, and has thus tacitly given its consent to be sued, when it enters into a business contract.

Here, the contract was for the maintenance of the facilities of the Indonesian embassy in the Philippines. The establishment of a diplomatic mission and the

maintenance of facilities therein are concededly governmental, not proprietary. Hence, the Republic of Indonesia may not be sued as it did not impliedly waive its sovereign immunity by entering into the subject maintenance contract.

Accordingly, the motion should be granted.

(b) Yes, AB has another remedy to ventilate his claim if the motion is granted.

A person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign may request his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels. In the Philippines, the aggrieved person may go to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) for this purpose. The DFA may first determine the impact of its espousal on the diplomatic relations between the Philippines and the foreign state. But once it decides to espouse the claim, the claim ceases to be a private cause of the aggrieved party.

In the case at bar, AB’s issue is against the Republic of Indonesia, a foreign sovereign that is immune from suits in the Philippines. Considering his lack of judicial remedy, AB may request the DFA to take up and espouse his claim with the Republic of Indonesia.

Thus, AB has another remedy to ventilate his claim if the motion is granted.

7. (a) No, the ICMBS is not, per se, a legally-binding domestic law.

International law can become domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law is converted into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism (e.g., thru local legislation). The incorporation method applies when, by constitutional fiat, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law, such as when the 1987 Constitution declares that the Philippines adopts the generally-accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

In this case, the ICMBS was issued by the World Health Association (WHA), not by the Philippine Congress. The Milk Code—an enactment in the exercise of President Aquino’s legislative power as head of the revolutionary government—is the domestic law. But although the Milk Code was enacted to give effect to the ICMBS, the latter was only partially adopted in the former. Thus, the ICMBS is legally binding not in itself, but only to the extent of its transformation into domestic law in the Milk Code. Moreover, the ICMBS is not a ratified treaty, an international custom, or a generally-accepted principle of international law. Thus, it cannot also be considered automatically part of the Philippine legal system via incorporation.

For the foregoing reasons, the ICMBS is not, per se, a legally-binding domestic law.

(b) No, the [R]IRR, to the extent that it implements the ICMBS, may not be justified under the doctrine of incorporation.

The doctrine of incorporation states that the Philippines adopts the generally-accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. In other words, international law may only be automatically considered part of the Philippine legal system if it is a generally-accepted principle or norm.

Here, the [R]IRR ostensibly implements not just the Milk Code but also the ICMBS. But as pointed out above, the ICMBS is not a ratified treaty, an international custom, or a generally-accepted principle of international law. Thus, the ICMBS cannot be implemented by the DOH by the mere expedient of enacting the [R]IRR.

It follows, therefore, that the [R]IRR, to the extent that it implements the ICMBS, may not be justified under the doctrine of incorporation.

8. (a) No, the suit should not be dismissed.

A GOCC with a legislative charter is suable if such charter provides that the GOCC may sue and be sued. This consent to be sued may be expressly provided in the charter itself, or by reference to another statute, such as the Corporation Code. When the charter says so, the nature of the function performed by the GOCC concerned is no longer material.

In the problem, the charter of the SMIA authorizes it to “exercise all powers of a corporation under the Corporation Code.” One of such powers is the power to sue and be sued. This constitutes the consent to be sued by the state.

In view thereof, the suit should not be dismissed.

(b) No, the denial of the motion to dismiss does not mean that the SMIA is now liable for damages.

Suability is not synonymous with liability. If a government corporation is suable, a trial must be held so the opposing sides will have the opportunity to prove their respective claims through the presentation of evidence. Only after the plaintiff proves his case will the defendant corporation be held liable.

In this case, the court merely denied the motion to dismiss anchored on the doctrine of non-suability. It is yet to conduct a trial on the merits and receive the parties’ respective pieces of evidence on the issue of SMIA’s liability.

The denial of the motion to dismiss does not, therefore, mean that the SMIA is now liable for damages.

(c) Yes, the court may order the garnishment of the SMIA funds to pay the damages awarded to the parents.

The rule is, funds of public corporations that can sue and be sued and have their own source of funds are not exempt from garnishment.

In this case, the SMIA is a public corporation that can sue and be sued. Moreover, it generates revenues through its operation in addition to its annual appropriations from Congress.

Hence, the court may order the garnishment of the SMIA funds to pay the damages awarded to the parents.

9. (a) No, there was no valid ratification in this case.

There is only one way to ratify a proposed revision of the 1987 Constitution: through a plebiscite called for that purpose, to be held not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after the approval of the text of the proposed new Constitution.

In this case, the supposed “ratification” happened not in a plebiscite but during the barangay assemblies. The latter is not a substantial compliance with the ratification requirement under the 1987 Constitution. A plebiscite and a barangay assembly have marked differences, such as the authority that calls, implements and supervises them, the people who can participate and vote, the manner of counting/ascertaining the vote of the participants, etc.

Thus, there was no valid ratification in this case.

(b) Respondents’ argument regarding sovereignty is misplaced.

Sec. 1, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Sovereignty in this provision must be understood in the context of republicanism—i.e., that our elected representatives derive their authority to govern from the people, the political sovereign themselves.

In the problem, the controversy centers on the manner of ratifying the proposed new Constitution, not about government authority delegated by the people to the officialdom. Hence, the relevant provision is Sec. 4(1), Art. XVII, not Sec. 1, Art. II, of the 1987 Constitution.

So, respondents’ argument regarding sovereignty is misplaced.

(c) Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, anything that violates the Constitution is void and without any force and effect. Constitutional norms are, after all, superior to contracts, statutes or executive acts.

In contrast, the concept of sovereignty of the people is a norm inherent in a democratic and republican state. It means that the people are the source of governmental authority. Without the consent of the governed, the government has no reason to exist. It also means that certain issues have to be directly decided by the people themselves. This happens in the system of initiative and referendum, or during a plebiscite.

In the present controversy, there is no conflict between constitutional supremacy and sovereignty:

As to the procedure for the ratification of the proposed revision, Sec. 4(1) of Art. XVII should be followed. This is because the sovereign people made a covenant that this is the manner by which they shall ratify a proposed change to their Social Contract. They have, thus, agreed to limit their sovereign powers in exchange for a clear and fixed procedure to determine their collective will on the issue of ratification.

As to the ratification itself—or whether or not the people should approve the proposed revision—they are only ones who ultimately decide. Nothing in the existing Charter limits their choice whether or not to vote for the ratification of the proposed change. In other words, the people themselves are supreme on this issue.

10. (a) Yes, the “puppet” government is de facto.

A de facto government is one that has no legal title. It is either of the following: (1) de facto government in the proper legal sense, or that which usurps the rightful government through a revolution; (2) de facto government of paramount force, or that which is established by military forces who invade an enemy territory in the course of war; and (3) de facto government by secession, or that which is established by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state.

In the problem, the “puppet” government was set up by the Chinese belligerents when they invaded and occupied the Philippines.

Hence, the “puppet” government is a de facto government, specifically a de facto government of paramount force.

(b) No, ZZ’s theory of suspended allegiance is not tenable.

During a belligerent occupation, sovereignty remains vested with the de jure government. What is suspended is the exercise by such government of rights pertaining to sovereignty, such the right to actually govern the occupied territories. Because of this, the correlative allegiance of the people should necessarily remain with the de jure government. Jurisprudence, in fact, teaches that there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

In the case at bar, ZZ’s theory of suspended allegiance was anchored on the mistaken proposition that the sovereignty of the legitimate Philippine government and the correlative duty of allegiance thereto are both suspended during the Chinese occupation.

Thus, ZZ’s theory of suspended allegiance is not tenable.

(c) No, the liberation will not invalidate AA’s prison sentence for serious physical injuries.

All acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid; they remain so even after it has been ousted and the de jure government has been reinstated. Conversely, political acts of the de facto government will cease to have force and effect after the liberation.

In this case, AA is convicted by final judgment of the crime of serious physical injuries, an ordinary, non-political crime defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code of the de jure government.

Consequently, the liberation will not invalidate his prison sentence for serious physical injuries.

(d) No, my answer will not be the same if AA is convicted of rebellion instead.

As already stated, all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid, and remain so even after it has been ousted and the de jure government has been reinstated. Conversely, political acts of the de facto government will cease to have force and effect after the liberation.

Here, AA is convicted by final judgment of rebellion. Rebellion under the Revised Penal Code is, per se, a crime of political complexion. Moreover, rebellion, in the context of this case, is a political offense as it was committed by AA against the de facto government. Thus, after the liberation, his conviction for rebellion will cease to be valid.

Ergo, my answer will not be the same. 

Reviewer Consti- mid term

1. No, the allocation of funds for the issuance of the commemorative stamps does not violate the prohibition against appropriating public funds for sectarian purpose.

Jurisprudence teaches that if public funds are used for a secular purpose, there is no violation of the prohibition against sectarian appropriations though such use may also incidentally benefit a religious group.

In this case, public funds are used by the PHLPost for a mainly secular purpose: to raise revenues through the sale of the commemorative stamps by taking advantage of the INC event. If at all, it merely recognizes a socio-cultural phenomenon of a purely home-grown religious sect celebrating its centenary. This was not intended to directly benefit the INC, monetarily or otherwise.

Hence, the allocation of funds for the issuance of the commemorative stamp does not violate the prohibition against appropriating public funds for sectarian purpose.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

2. Yes, this is a justiciable issue.

An issue is justiciable if it pertains to the legality or constitutionality of an action of a branch or instrumentality of the government, or the determination of the meaning or scope of a power enshrined in the Constitution.

In this case, the petitioners raise as an issue the legality or constitutionality of the President’s creation of a commission to draft the revision of the 1987 Constitution. This also involves a determination of the President’s role during the proposal stage in constitutional revision.

Hence, this is a justiciable issue.

3. The respondents are not correct.

A political question involves an issue not for the courts, but for the political branches or the people themselves, to decide. On the other hand, jurisprudence teaches that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law is lodged in the President alone. After all, Sec. 18 of Art. VII empowers the President to “place the Philippines or any part thereof” under martial law if there is sufficient factual basis therefor. However, even matters within the discretion of the President may be subject to judicial review, and is therefore justiciable, if he gravely abuses his discretion.

In this case, the actual rebellion appears localized in Metro Manila and in some areas in Luzon. Yet, the President declares martial law all over the Philippines. The petitioners’ argument is not that there is no factual basis to declare martial law, but that there is no factual basis to put the entire country under martial law. This is akin to saying that the President gravely abuses his discretion, doubtless not a political but a justiciable issue.

Ergo, the respondents are not correct.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

4. No, the TRO does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.

Courts have the inherent power to supervise and even control the implementation of their final and executory judgments. Concurrently, the President also has the power to grant executive clemency (pardon, reprieve, commutation of sentence, etc.) after an accused has been convicted by final judgment. Thus, post-judgment incidents may involve the exercise of concurrent powers by the judicial and executive departments.

In this case, the Supreme Court en banc issues the subject TRO as an exercise of its power to supervise and control the execution of AB’s death sentence. At the same time, the President also exercises his concurrent prerogative to deny executive clemency to AB.

Consequently, the TRO does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.

5. Yes, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition, but only to determine whether or not the House committed grave abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over political questions, such as those arising from the exercise by the political branches of their exclusive prerogatives. The High Tribunal, however, has the expanded power of judicial review to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality gravely abused its discretion.

In this case, Congressman XX questions before the Supreme Court the validity of (1) the action of the Committee dismissing his complaint for insufficiency in substance due to his lack of personal knowledge over his allegations (though personal knowledge was not required by the Rules on Impeachment at that time); and (2) the subsequent action of the House plenary ratifying the action of the Committee and amending its Rules on Impeachment. Though these issues arise from the initiation of the impeachment case—a power is textually and exclusively committed to the Lower House in the Constitution—XX alleges, and is able to make a prima facie showing, that the House gravely abused its discretion.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not the House committed grave abuse of discretion.

6. No, the motion should not be granted.

Under the concept of restrictive sovereign immunity, foreign states are deemed to have waived their immunity from suits if they engage in proprietary or commercial endeavors.

In this case, the Republic of EE engaged in a proprietary or commercial endeavor as its business office in Manila traded products exported from EE. This results in the implied waiver of the sovereign immunity of the Republic of EE.

So, the motion should not be granted.

7. The petition should not be given due course.

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over political questions—i.e., those arising from the exercise by a political branch of a power exclusively vested in it under the Constitution—except if there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, Senator FD’s motion to dismiss before the Senate Ethics Committee is anchored on the submission that uttering unparliamentary words does not constitute disorderly conduct. The Committee denies the motion presumably because it finds that uttering unparliamentary words may constitute disorderly conduct. This is within the discretion of the Committee. There is no showing that this constitutes grave abuse of discretion as disorderly conduct is not even defined in the Constitution.

As a result, the petition should not be given due course.

8. No, the counter-argument is not tenable.

During preliminary investigations, the principle of non-interference and the underlying doctrine of separation of powers are not absolute. They admit of exceptions, as when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the prosecutor’s office and/or the DOJ. When the exception arises, the principle of non-interference does not apply and the courts have jurisdiction, but only to determine whether indeed there is grave abuse of discretion.

In this case, the complainants’ petition with the CA is anchored on the submission that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of the investigating prosecutor. The CA has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether the DOJ indeed gravely abused its discretion.

Therefore, the counter-argument is not tenable.

9. The arguments have no merit.

The power of Congress to delegate emergency powers to the President under Sec. 23(2) of Article VI is subject to the following conditions: (1) there must be a war or other national emergency; (2) the delegation must be for a limited period only; (3) the delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and (4) the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. The plenary power of Congress includes the prerogative to determine what constitutes “national emergency.” Because “national emergency” is not defined in Sec. 23(2) of Article VI, Congress has the discretion to determine its meaning and scope.

In this case, Congress makes a determination that the “worsening traffic crisis” is a form of “national emergency.” This is not without basis. The traffic crisis does not only affect urban areas; it also affects the rest of the country because it has a deleterious impact on the economy. This cannot be rightfully characterized as a grave abuse of discretion.

Moreover, the subject sunset clause is not invalid. As pointed out above, the delegation of emergency powers is for a limited period only. In the exercise of its plenary power, Congress decides that the delegation should be effective for one year only. This is something Congress can do. After all, there is nothing in the Constitution that bars Congress from providing a different duration to the emergency powers it delegates to the President.

Hence, the arguments have no merit.

10. No, the standby authority is not a case of undue delegation of legislative power.

Congress may delegate to executive officers the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute depends. This is called contingent rule-making. For the delegation to be valid, Congress must prescribe sufficient standards on the delegated authority.

In this case, Congress delegated to the President a standby authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% effective January 1, 2006. This is subject to the following conditions: (i) VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5 %); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 1/2%). These conditions constitute the standards circumscribing the President’s authority to increase the VAT rate.

Consequently, the stand-by authority is not a case of undue delegation of legislative power.

11. The subject phrase in Sec. 8 unduly delegates legislative power to the President.

There are two tests to determine whether a delegation of legislative power is valid: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. In the former, the law must set forth a complete legislative policy to be implemented by the delegate. In the latter, there must be adequate guidelines in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 

In this case, Sec. 8 passes the completeness test because the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text. However, the subject phrase does not contain a sufficient standard to adequately limit the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. The phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any purpose he may direct. It allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds even beyond the purview of the law.

Ergo, the subject phrase in Sec. 8 unduly delegates legislative power to the President.

12. No, the successive holding by AA, BB, and CC of the office of the district representative of Cebu City North District is not an example of a political dynasty.

Sec. 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the state shall “prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.” The text shows that the framers intended to prohibit political dynasties, but left it to Congress to enact the implementing legislation containing, among others, the definition of political dynasties.

In this case, there is no mention that Congress has already enacted a law defining a political dynasty. Absent such legislation, there is no way of knowing whether the scenario involving AA, BB, and CC constitutes a political dynasty.  

Accordingly, this is not an example of a political dynasty.

13. Yes, the grant of authority to impose the alternative penalty of imprisonment “in the discretion of the court” is an undue delegation of legislative power.

There are two tests to determine whether a delegation of legislative power is valid: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. In the former, the law must set forth a complete legislative policy to be implemented by the delegate. In the latter, there must be adequate guidelines in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Moreover, in a penal legislation, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment is a legislative policy that must be enunciated in the law. It cannot be validly supplied by the courts themselves.

In this case, the provision does not state the duration of the alternative penalty of imprisonment. This makes the provision incomplete, in violation of the first test.

Therefore, the grant of authority to impose the alternative penalty of imprisonment is an undue delegation of legislative power.

14. Yes, the controversy is justiciable.

Under its expanded power of judicial review, the Supreme Court has the duty to determine whether a branch or instrumentality of the government has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the officers of the Houses of Congress mentioned in the Constitution are only the Senate President and the House Speaker. However, each House has the authority to choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

In this case, Congressman TB is questioning the validity of the election of Congressman DS as minority leader despite the House tradition of choosing as minority leader the loser of the speakership race. Though the minority leader is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, there is an issue here on whether Congressman DS’ election constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction.

Thus, the controversy is justiciable.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

15. Yes, the dismissal of the suit for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, but not against the individual defendants, is correct.

The state cannot be sued without its consent. The doctrine of non-suability may be invoked by public officers and employees who are sued for damages in connection with the performance of their official functions. However, if they exceed their official functions, the doctrine of non-suability would not apply. They may then be sued for damages in their personal capacity.

In this case, there is no showing that the Republic has waived its immunity. On the other hand, there is a prima facie showing that the individual defendants exceeded their official functions. They apparently failed to exercise maximum tolerance. One of them rammed a police vehicle on the demonstrators, causing injuries to the plaintiffs. Under the concept of command responsibility, the police officials may also be sued for damages in their personal capacity for the excesses of their subordinates.

So, this course of action is correct.

16. The new law is invalid.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of constitutional questions. Congress, though a co-equal body, does not have the authority to undo a decision of the High Tribunal declaring a law unconstitutional.  

In this case, the Supreme Court previously declared the 5th paragraph of Sec. 10, R.A. 8042 violative of the Equal Protection Clause. However, Congress subsequently enacted R.A. 10222 practically reinstating the provision struck down. This is an encroachment by Congress of the power of the Supreme Court.

Hence, the new law is invalid.

17. No, the motion [to dismiss] is not meritorious.

The doctrine of governmental immunity from suits cannot be invoked if it will cause an injustice to a citizen. Jurisprudence teaches that if the government takes private property for public use without paying just compensation, it is deemed to have impliedly waived its immunity.

In this case, the national government used a portion of DD’s land for a road widening project without prior expropriation or negotiated purchase. It has, thus, waived its immunity from suits. However, DD’s cause of action for restoration (recovery) of possession cannot be tried as this relief is contrary to public policy.

Consequently, the motion is not meritorious.

18. The [BNN] Constitution would prevail.

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, in case of an irreconcilable conflict between the Constitution, on the one hand, and statutes, treaties, or executive acts, on the other hand, the former shall prevail.

In this case, there is an irreconcilable conflict between the Constitution and the defense treaty. The BNN Constitution provides that “[n]o foreign military bases shall be allowed in BNN territory.” However, the treaty apparently allows basing of EVA Federation troops in BNN territory for training exercises.

Hence, the [BNN] Constitution would prevail.

19. The arguments against the WTO lack merit.

Although sovereignty is supreme and absolute in the domestic sphere, it may be limited in the international arena by a voluntary act of the state (e.g., by entering into a treaty), or involuntarily by simply being a member of the family of nations. This is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation. In this case, although our entry into the WTO may limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty, this is not unconstitutional per se. This is a move calculated to obtain concessions and reciprocal benefits from the other states-parties to the WTO.

On the other hand, our entry to the WTO does not mean that Congress cannot anymore pass a law good for our national interest but not in conformity with the WTO. Our treaty obligations are, in theory, not a hindrance to the exercise by Congress of its plenary legislative power. In this case, Congress may still enact laws that are good for our national interest, even if they are not in conformity with the WTO. After all, police power cannot be bargained away through a treaty. (It goes without saying that there will be repercussions if we refuse to comply with our treaty commitments.)

20. The Cory Aquino government started as a de facto government but later became a de jure government.

A de facto government is one without a legal title and is established, among others, by a revolution. If a revolutionary movement succeeds in completely overthrowing the previous legal order, it will now be free to establish its own legal system and government. Thus, it may become the new de jure, or legal and rightful, government.

In this case, the Cory Aquino government was established through a revolution—a generally peaceful one. At the outset, it existed parallel to the government of Ferdinand Marcos and Arturo Tolentino, the winners of the snap election as proclaimed by the COMELEC. Under the legal system constituted under the 1973 Constitution, the government led by Cory Aquino and Doy Laurel, although in control of some parts of the country, was not the legal and rightful government. However, when the Marcoses left the country, Cory Aquino was able to consolidate power. When she issued Proclamation No. 3, she raised the status of her government into the new rightful government, which was, by then, ostensibly accepted by the majority of the Filipinos and by the international community.

 So, the Cory Aquino government started as a de facto government but later became a de jure government.