Reviewer Consti- mid term

1. No, the allocation of funds for the issuance of the commemorative stamps does not violate the prohibition against appropriating public funds for sectarian purpose.

Jurisprudence teaches that if public funds are used for a secular purpose, there is no violation of the prohibition against sectarian appropriations though such use may also incidentally benefit a religious group.

In this case, public funds are used by the PHLPost for a mainly secular purpose: to raise revenues through the sale of the commemorative stamps by taking advantage of the INC event. If at all, it merely recognizes a socio-cultural phenomenon of a purely home-grown religious sect celebrating its centenary. This was not intended to directly benefit the INC, monetarily or otherwise.

Hence, the allocation of funds for the issuance of the commemorative stamp does not violate the prohibition against appropriating public funds for sectarian purpose.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

2. Yes, this is a justiciable issue.

An issue is justiciable if it pertains to the legality or constitutionality of an action of a branch or instrumentality of the government, or the determination of the meaning or scope of a power enshrined in the Constitution.

In this case, the petitioners raise as an issue the legality or constitutionality of the President’s creation of a commission to draft the revision of the 1987 Constitution. This also involves a determination of the President’s role during the proposal stage in constitutional revision.

Hence, this is a justiciable issue.

3. The respondents are not correct.

A political question involves an issue not for the courts, but for the political branches or the people themselves, to decide. On the other hand, jurisprudence teaches that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law is lodged in the President alone. After all, Sec. 18 of Art. VII empowers the President to “place the Philippines or any part thereof” under martial law if there is sufficient factual basis therefor. However, even matters within the discretion of the President may be subject to judicial review, and is therefore justiciable, if he gravely abuses his discretion.

In this case, the actual rebellion appears localized in Metro Manila and in some areas in Luzon. Yet, the President declares martial law all over the Philippines. The petitioners’ argument is not that there is no factual basis to declare martial law, but that there is no factual basis to put the entire country under martial law. This is akin to saying that the President gravely abuses his discretion, doubtless not a political but a justiciable issue.

Ergo, the respondents are not correct.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

4. No, the TRO does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.

Courts have the inherent power to supervise and even control the implementation of their final and executory judgments. Concurrently, the President also has the power to grant executive clemency (pardon, reprieve, commutation of sentence, etc.) after an accused has been convicted by final judgment. Thus, post-judgment incidents may involve the exercise of concurrent powers by the judicial and executive departments.

In this case, the Supreme Court en banc issues the subject TRO as an exercise of its power to supervise and control the execution of AB’s death sentence. At the same time, the President also exercises his concurrent prerogative to deny executive clemency to AB.

Consequently, the TRO does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.

5. Yes, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition, but only to determine whether or not the House committed grave abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over political questions, such as those arising from the exercise by the political branches of their exclusive prerogatives. The High Tribunal, however, has the expanded power of judicial review to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality gravely abused its discretion.

In this case, Congressman XX questions before the Supreme Court the validity of (1) the action of the Committee dismissing his complaint for insufficiency in substance due to his lack of personal knowledge over his allegations (though personal knowledge was not required by the Rules on Impeachment at that time); and (2) the subsequent action of the House plenary ratifying the action of the Committee and amending its Rules on Impeachment. Though these issues arise from the initiation of the impeachment case—a power is textually and exclusively committed to the Lower House in the Constitution—XX alleges, and is able to make a prima facie showing, that the House gravely abused its discretion.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not the House committed grave abuse of discretion.

6. No, the motion should not be granted.

Under the concept of restrictive sovereign immunity, foreign states are deemed to have waived their immunity from suits if they engage in proprietary or commercial endeavors.

In this case, the Republic of EE engaged in a proprietary or commercial endeavor as its business office in Manila traded products exported from EE. This results in the implied waiver of the sovereign immunity of the Republic of EE.

So, the motion should not be granted.

7. The petition should not be given due course.

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over political questions—i.e., those arising from the exercise by a political branch of a power exclusively vested in it under the Constitution—except if there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, Senator FD’s motion to dismiss before the Senate Ethics Committee is anchored on the submission that uttering unparliamentary words does not constitute disorderly conduct. The Committee denies the motion presumably because it finds that uttering unparliamentary words may constitute disorderly conduct. This is within the discretion of the Committee. There is no showing that this constitutes grave abuse of discretion as disorderly conduct is not even defined in the Constitution.

As a result, the petition should not be given due course.

8. No, the counter-argument is not tenable.

During preliminary investigations, the principle of non-interference and the underlying doctrine of separation of powers are not absolute. They admit of exceptions, as when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the prosecutor’s office and/or the DOJ. When the exception arises, the principle of non-interference does not apply and the courts have jurisdiction, but only to determine whether indeed there is grave abuse of discretion.

In this case, the complainants’ petition with the CA is anchored on the submission that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of the investigating prosecutor. The CA has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether the DOJ indeed gravely abused its discretion.

Therefore, the counter-argument is not tenable.

9. The arguments have no merit.

The power of Congress to delegate emergency powers to the President under Sec. 23(2) of Article VI is subject to the following conditions: (1) there must be a war or other national emergency; (2) the delegation must be for a limited period only; (3) the delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and (4) the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. The plenary power of Congress includes the prerogative to determine what constitutes “national emergency.” Because “national emergency” is not defined in Sec. 23(2) of Article VI, Congress has the discretion to determine its meaning and scope.

In this case, Congress makes a determination that the “worsening traffic crisis” is a form of “national emergency.” This is not without basis. The traffic crisis does not only affect urban areas; it also affects the rest of the country because it has a deleterious impact on the economy. This cannot be rightfully characterized as a grave abuse of discretion.

Moreover, the subject sunset clause is not invalid. As pointed out above, the delegation of emergency powers is for a limited period only. In the exercise of its plenary power, Congress decides that the delegation should be effective for one year only. This is something Congress can do. After all, there is nothing in the Constitution that bars Congress from providing a different duration to the emergency powers it delegates to the President.

Hence, the arguments have no merit.

10. No, the standby authority is not a case of undue delegation of legislative power.

Congress may delegate to executive officers the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute depends. This is called contingent rule-making. For the delegation to be valid, Congress must prescribe sufficient standards on the delegated authority.

In this case, Congress delegated to the President a standby authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% effective January 1, 2006. This is subject to the following conditions: (i) VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5 %); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 1/2%). These conditions constitute the standards circumscribing the President’s authority to increase the VAT rate.

Consequently, the stand-by authority is not a case of undue delegation of legislative power.

11. The subject phrase in Sec. 8 unduly delegates legislative power to the President.

There are two tests to determine whether a delegation of legislative power is valid: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. In the former, the law must set forth a complete legislative policy to be implemented by the delegate. In the latter, there must be adequate guidelines in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 

In this case, Sec. 8 passes the completeness test because the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text. However, the subject phrase does not contain a sufficient standard to adequately limit the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. The phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any purpose he may direct. It allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds even beyond the purview of the law.

Ergo, the subject phrase in Sec. 8 unduly delegates legislative power to the President.

12. No, the successive holding by AA, BB, and CC of the office of the district representative of Cebu City North District is not an example of a political dynasty.

Sec. 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the state shall “prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.” The text shows that the framers intended to prohibit political dynasties, but left it to Congress to enact the implementing legislation containing, among others, the definition of political dynasties.

In this case, there is no mention that Congress has already enacted a law defining a political dynasty. Absent such legislation, there is no way of knowing whether the scenario involving AA, BB, and CC constitutes a political dynasty.  

Accordingly, this is not an example of a political dynasty.

13. Yes, the grant of authority to impose the alternative penalty of imprisonment “in the discretion of the court” is an undue delegation of legislative power.

There are two tests to determine whether a delegation of legislative power is valid: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. In the former, the law must set forth a complete legislative policy to be implemented by the delegate. In the latter, there must be adequate guidelines in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Moreover, in a penal legislation, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment is a legislative policy that must be enunciated in the law. It cannot be validly supplied by the courts themselves.

In this case, the provision does not state the duration of the alternative penalty of imprisonment. This makes the provision incomplete, in violation of the first test.

Therefore, the grant of authority to impose the alternative penalty of imprisonment is an undue delegation of legislative power.

14. Yes, the controversy is justiciable.

Under its expanded power of judicial review, the Supreme Court has the duty to determine whether a branch or instrumentality of the government has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the officers of the Houses of Congress mentioned in the Constitution are only the Senate President and the House Speaker. However, each House has the authority to choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

In this case, Congressman TB is questioning the validity of the election of Congressman DS as minority leader despite the House tradition of choosing as minority leader the loser of the speakership race. Though the minority leader is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, there is an issue here on whether Congressman DS’ election constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction.

Thus, the controversy is justiciable.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

15. Yes, the dismissal of the suit for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, but not against the individual defendants, is correct.

The state cannot be sued without its consent. The doctrine of non-suability may be invoked by public officers and employees who are sued for damages in connection with the performance of their official functions. However, if they exceed their official functions, the doctrine of non-suability would not apply. They may then be sued for damages in their personal capacity.

In this case, there is no showing that the Republic has waived its immunity. On the other hand, there is a prima facie showing that the individual defendants exceeded their official functions. They apparently failed to exercise maximum tolerance. One of them rammed a police vehicle on the demonstrators, causing injuries to the plaintiffs. Under the concept of command responsibility, the police officials may also be sued for damages in their personal capacity for the excesses of their subordinates.

So, this course of action is correct.

16. The new law is invalid.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of constitutional questions. Congress, though a co-equal body, does not have the authority to undo a decision of the High Tribunal declaring a law unconstitutional.  

In this case, the Supreme Court previously declared the 5th paragraph of Sec. 10, R.A. 8042 violative of the Equal Protection Clause. However, Congress subsequently enacted R.A. 10222 practically reinstating the provision struck down. This is an encroachment by Congress of the power of the Supreme Court.

Hence, the new law is invalid.

17. No, the motion [to dismiss] is not meritorious.

The doctrine of governmental immunity from suits cannot be invoked if it will cause an injustice to a citizen. Jurisprudence teaches that if the government takes private property for public use without paying just compensation, it is deemed to have impliedly waived its immunity.

In this case, the national government used a portion of DD’s land for a road widening project without prior expropriation or negotiated purchase. It has, thus, waived its immunity from suits. However, DD’s cause of action for restoration (recovery) of possession cannot be tried as this relief is contrary to public policy.

Consequently, the motion is not meritorious.

18. The [BNN] Constitution would prevail.

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, in case of an irreconcilable conflict between the Constitution, on the one hand, and statutes, treaties, or executive acts, on the other hand, the former shall prevail.

In this case, there is an irreconcilable conflict between the Constitution and the defense treaty. The BNN Constitution provides that “[n]o foreign military bases shall be allowed in BNN territory.” However, the treaty apparently allows basing of EVA Federation troops in BNN territory for training exercises.

Hence, the [BNN] Constitution would prevail.

19. The arguments against the WTO lack merit.

Although sovereignty is supreme and absolute in the domestic sphere, it may be limited in the international arena by a voluntary act of the state (e.g., by entering into a treaty), or involuntarily by simply being a member of the family of nations. This is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation. In this case, although our entry into the WTO may limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty, this is not unconstitutional per se. This is a move calculated to obtain concessions and reciprocal benefits from the other states-parties to the WTO.

On the other hand, our entry to the WTO does not mean that Congress cannot anymore pass a law good for our national interest but not in conformity with the WTO. Our treaty obligations are, in theory, not a hindrance to the exercise by Congress of its plenary legislative power. In this case, Congress may still enact laws that are good for our national interest, even if they are not in conformity with the WTO. After all, police power cannot be bargained away through a treaty. (It goes without saying that there will be repercussions if we refuse to comply with our treaty commitments.)

20. The Cory Aquino government started as a de facto government but later became a de jure government.

A de facto government is one without a legal title and is established, among others, by a revolution. If a revolutionary movement succeeds in completely overthrowing the previous legal order, it will now be free to establish its own legal system and government. Thus, it may become the new de jure, or legal and rightful, government.

In this case, the Cory Aquino government was established through a revolution—a generally peaceful one. At the outset, it existed parallel to the government of Ferdinand Marcos and Arturo Tolentino, the winners of the snap election as proclaimed by the COMELEC. Under the legal system constituted under the 1973 Constitution, the government led by Cory Aquino and Doy Laurel, although in control of some parts of the country, was not the legal and rightful government. However, when the Marcoses left the country, Cory Aquino was able to consolidate power. When she issued Proclamation No. 3, she raised the status of her government into the new rightful government, which was, by then, ostensibly accepted by the majority of the Filipinos and by the international community.

 So, the Cory Aquino government started as a de facto government but later became a de jure government.